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Executive Summary  
 
In protecting safety, health, and the environment, government has increasingly 
relied on cost-benefit analysis. In undertaking cost-benefit analysis, the government has 
monetized risks of death through the idea of “value of a statistical life” (VSL), currently 
assessed at about $6.1 million. Many analysts, however, have suggested that the 
government should rely instead on the “value of a statistical life year” (VSLY), in a way 
that would likely result in significantly lower benefits calculations for elderly people, and 
significantly higher benefits calculations for children. I urge that the government should 
indeed focus on life-years rather than lives. A program that saves young people produces 
more welfare than one that saves old people. The hard question involves not whether to 
undertake this shift, but how to monetize life-years, and here willingness to pay (WTP) is 
generally the place to begin. Nor does a focus on life-years run afoul of ethical limits on 
cost-benefit analysis. It is relevant in this connection that every old person was once 
young, and that if all goes well, young people will eventually be old. In fact, a focus on 
statistical lives is more plausibly a form of illicit discrimination than a focus on life-
years, because the idea of statistical lives treats the years of older people as worth far 
more than the years of younger people. Discussion is also devoted to the uses and limits 
of the willingness to pay criterion in regulatory policy, with reference to the underlying 
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  In the last two decades, numerous regulatory agencies have conducted cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) of proposed rules.
1 To undertake this analysis, they have had to 
quantify the value of a statistical life (VSL).
2 Recently the range, for that value, has been 
between  $1.5 million and $6.1 million.
3 But there is a conspicuous difficulty with the use 
of a uniform VSL. Some regulatory programs benefit people who are relatively young; 
others benefit people who are relatively old. If a program would prevent fifty deaths of 
people who are twenty, should it be treated the same way as a program that would 
prevent fifty deaths of people who are seventy? Some people believe that other things 
being equal, a program that protects young people is better than one that protects old 
people,
4 because it delivers greater benefits. In their view, government should consider 
not simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should concern itself also or 
instead with the number of life-years, or the value of statistical life-years (VSLY). At the 
very least, VSLY is a more precise measure of what is at stake. 
   At least since 1976, analysts have suggested the possibility of focussing 
regulatory policy on either life-years or quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs).
5 Through 
                                                 
1 See Robert Hahn, Global Regulatory Reform (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994). 
2 See id. 
3 See Robert Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
323, 334-35 (2001). For discussion of why these numbers might be too low, see Dora Costa and Matthew 
Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 American Economic Review 227, 229 (Papers and 
Proceedings) (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of $12 million) Richard Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99  COL  L R EV 941 (1999) 
(suggesting the need to inflate current figures for increases in social wealth and in the particular context of 
dreaded and involuntary risks); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L. J. 2255 (2002) 
(discussing plausible reasons to adjust current figures upwards); Dora  L. Costa and Matthew Kahn, 
Changes in the Value of Life: 1940-1980 (2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=364740. For recent evidence that the current numbers 
are indeed too low, see W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of A Statistical Life 
(2003), available on ssrn.com (finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males). 
4 See, eg, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Economic 
Inquiry 369  (1988). 
5 Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 




the latter measure, the issue is not merely the number of life-years saved by regulation; 
attention is also paid to qualitative improvements in health.
6 An aggregate measure of 
QALYs would catalogue all of the health-related benefits of regulation. And for many 
years, some agencies have experimented with the idea that cost-benefit analysis should 
consider  either QALYs or life-years, not merely the number of lives saved.
7 For 
simplicity, my major focus here is on life-years, which imposes lower informational 
demands on regulators than do QALYs.
8 A moment’s reflection will show that VSLY can 
produce different results from VSL. If the beneficiaries of a regulation are mostly elderly 
people, then the regulation will seem far less attractive with the use of VSLY than with 
VSL.
9 But if the beneficiaries are mostly children, then a regulation will seem far more 
attractive with VSLY than with VSL.
10  
  The issue received a great deal of public attention in connection with recent 
debates within Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).
11 In its “Clear Skies” proposal, EPA estimated benefits both 
by using the $6.1 million figure and by using an alternative method that produced 
numbers of $3.7 million for those under 70 and $2.3 million for those 70 and older.
12 The 
difference between $3.7 and $2.3 million triggered intense criticism of a “senior death 
discount.”
13 Eventually EPA abandoned the idea of varying VSL on the basis of age,
14 
perhaps as a result of public pressure, and partly because the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) found methodological problems with the studies that supported the age-
adjustment analysis.
15 But OMB has been strongly encouraging federal agencies, 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 For examples, see Appendix. 
8 The reason is that in assessing life-years, government need not concern itself with issues of the quality of 
life. I offer a brief discussion of QALYs below. 
9 I am assuming a relatively uniform value, for each statistical life year, and hence assuming that the 
valuation of each of the remaining years of seniors is not going to be much higher than the valuation of 
each of the remaining years of younger people. If older people’s remaining years have a much higher 
valuation, the conclusion in the text does not follow. For discussion, see below. 
10 The same qualification is appropriate here as in note 9; if children’s life-years are valued in terms of 
WTP, and if their WTP is low, the statement in the text would not follow. 
11 For recent discussion, see Robert H. Hahn and Scott Wallsten, Is Granny Worth $2.3 Million or $6.1 
Million?, http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=138 
12 See id. 
13 See John Tierney, Life: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, section 4, p. 3, The New York Times, May 18, 2003. 
14 Id. 
15 See Memorandum of John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 




including the EPA, to consider VSLY,
16 and OMB’s draft guidelines on cost-benefit 
analysis ask agencies to “consider providing estimates of both VSL and VSLY.”
17  
Thus OMB has urged that “agency analysts, when performing benefit-cost 
analysis, present results using both the VSL and the VSLY methods.”
18 OMB also 
suggests “that agencies present analyses with larger VSLY estimates for senior 
citizens.”
19 Building on existing studies, one proposal would value each year of life at 
$273,000 for people over 65 but at $172,000 for people who are younger.
20 Because the 
number of remaining years is a central part of the proposed calculus, a 65-year old, with a 
life expectancy of ten more years, would be valued at $2.7 million, whereas a 40-year 
old, with thirty-five years left, would be valued at $6 million. Thus regulations protecting 
people over forty would be worth less than they would under the $6.1 million benchmark, 
whereas those under forty would be worth more. A ten-year old, with sixty-five years 
left, would be valued at over $11 million. 
 My principal claim in this essay is that in terms of welfare, it is fully appropriate 
to focus on life-years, not merely lives, and that both academic and public criticisms of 
the life-years approach are misconceived. The reasons for this conclusion are simple: No 
program literally “saves” lives; life-extension is always what is at issue. If the goal is to 
promote people’s welfare by lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves 500 life-years 
(and, let us say, twenty-five people) is, other things equal, better than a regulation that 
saves 50 life-years (also, let us say, twenty-five people). A program that saves younger 
people is better, along every dimension, than an otherwise identical program that saves 
                                                 
16 See id.; Dana Wilkie, White House Continues to Push For “Age” Discount In Rulemaking, Copley News 
Service (May 16, 2003), a vailable at 
https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b9948ff37008fac2330e2ce6a66f5e57&docnum=4&_fmtstr=F
ULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-lSlWk&_md5=aaa30b6f202f7e1e23717bc35a2806b1. 
17 See Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003). 
18 See Memorandum of John Graham, supra note, at 2.  
19 Id. I raise questions about this recommendation below. In brief, older people might be willing to pay 
more for risk reduction than younger people, but the higher willingness to pay need not reveal a greater 
welfare gain from risk reduction.  
20 See Hahn and Wallsten, supra note. EPA’s current estimates are $170,000 for those under age 65 and 
$434,000 for those over age 65. See Memorandum of John Graham, supra note, at 2 note **. For a lifetime 
risk faced by someone who is now 40, it would be sensible to calculate each life year, before 65, at the 
lower rate, and to calculate each life year, after that age, at the higher rate, subject to the appropriate 
discount rate. OMB says, delicately, that “[m]ore research is needed to provide a complete picture of how 





21––a statement that seems controversial only if we see life as a snapshot in 
which people are frozen at their current points in the age distribution. My most modest 
suggestion, then, is that in producing regulatory impact analyses,
22 agencies should do a 
sensitivity analysis in which they inquire into life-years as well as lives––and take 
account of that sensitivity analysis in deciding what to do. My more ambitious suggestion 
is that at least in general, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) should be conducted with primary 
attention to VSLY rather than VSL. If CBA is to be used at all, it is because CBA is a 
rough way of testing whether a regulation will promote people’s welfare, understood to 
mean their actual well-being in their lives.
23 An inquiry into VSLY is an important way 
of answering that question. 
Even if we agree that life-years matter, there remains the separate and quite 
vexing question of how to turn them into monetary equivalents. For VSL, willingness-to-
pay (WTP) studies are used to produce the relevant values.
24  Economists and others who 
are economically oriented urge that CBA is properly based on WTP for the various 
benefits of regulation.
25 On this view, policymakers should use different values for old 
people and young people if and only if WTP studies show such a disparity.
26 Indeed, this 
view has been endorsed by the Office of Management and Budget itself.
27 I urge that the 
argument for relying on WTP is most secure i n cases in which the beneficiaries of 
regulation have to pay all of its cost. So long as people have adequate information, 
                                                 
21 The “other  things being equal” proviso is important here. I put to one side the problem  of transition, 
taken up below. Note also that a decision to shift from VSL to VSLY will be harmful to people who are 
now older and who did not benefit from earlier use of VSLY. 
22 As required by Executive Order 12866, 3 CFR 638 (1993). 
23 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165 (1999). 
Throughout I use the idea of welfare in a nonsectarian sense. I do not mean to identify the idea with the 
utilitarian account, and I do not mean to reduce welfare to “happiness,” narrowly defined. As I use the 
term, it is agnostic on the controversial normative questions. On utitarianism and consequentialism, see 
Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J Phil 463 (1979); for general discussion, see Amartya Sen, 
Development As Freedom (1999). I believe that without resolving any difficult normative questions, it is 
possible to show that VSLY is preferable to VSL, and more generally to show that WTP is an inadequate 
proxy for welfare in many circumstances. On some of the emp irical issues involved in measuring welfare, 
see Bruno S. Frey and Aliois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics 4 -11 (2001);Alberto Alesina et al., 
Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different? (2001). 
24 See Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note. 
25 See, e.g., Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? 
Evidence  from the United States and Canada (unpublished manuscript 2002). 




government does them no favors by requiring them to purchase goods for which they are 
not willing to pay. When the beneficiaries of regulation do not pay its full cost, the 
argument for making WTP conclusive is less strong. Nonetheless, I urge that WTP is a 
reasonable starting point for monetizing life- years, but that agencies should be permitted 
to make adjustments when the beneficiaries of regulation lack information or when they 
would pay only a fraction of its cost. 
Any defense of relying on life-years has to come to terms with some equitable 
objections to what seems to be a form of age discrimination.
28 A large goal here is to 
answer those objections. In one view, each life should count for no more and no less than 
one. In this view, a focus on life-years or VSLY violates the equality principle, because it 
treats elderly people as if they were worth less (literally) than younger people. This 
argument, I suggest, is rooted in a generally sound moral intuition: Sometimes the pursuit 
of welfare should be constrained by considerations of justice. It is at least imaginable, for 
example, that one hundred white people would receive more welfare from the elimination 
of a risk of 1/100,000 than would one hundred African-Americans. But even if this is so, 
government should not create an “African-American death discount.”
29 The reason is that 
the welfare difference––assuming that it exists––is a product of past and present injustice. 
By contrast, injustice is not the source of the welfare difference between the protection of 
one hundred children and the protection of one hundred elderly people. Because every 
old person was once young, an emphasis on life-years does not discriminate against 
anyone; the very people who lose, in a sense, when older also gained when younger. In 
fact the use of a uniform VSL is best taken as a form of discrimination against younger 
people, because it treats each of their anticipated years as less valuable than those of older 
people. As I shall also show, an emphasis on life-years does not run afoul of the 
principles that animate the prohibition on age discrimination. 
The choice between lives and life-years is clear and simple; it gives the 
appearance of difficulty only because of a kind of optical illusion, which suggests some 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 See 68 Fed. Reg. 5521 (Feb. 3, 2003), suggesting that those who endorse VSLY assume “that the public 
is willing to pay more money for a rule that saves an average of 10 life years per person than a rule that 
saves one year per person.”  
28 See the overview in John McKie et al., The Allocation of Health Care Resources: An Ethical Evaluation 
of the QALY Approach 47-72 (1998). 




choice “between” older people and younger ones. But a discussion of the underlying 
problems provides a window onto a much larger and more complex set of questions. My 
discussion of those questions is tentative, but I touch on three more general issues. First, 
economists and policymakers should not take the willingness to pay criterion too 
seriously, and they are in danger of doing precisely that.
30 As a measure of welfare, that 
criterion has several advantages, above all in circumstances in which regulation amounts 
to a forced exchange, requiring people to “buy” a benefit that they may or may not find it 
in their interest to buy. But in some contexts, no forced exchange is involved, because the 
beneficiaries of regulation do not have to pay for it. And in some contexts, willingness to 
pay is a poor proxy for welfare. In such contexts, regulators should abandon it and think 
about welfare directly if they c an.
31 I attempt to bring recent work on people’s 
mispredictions of the welfare effects of their own choices to bear on that question,
32 with 
the suggestion that this work raises doubts about the use of WTP in many situations.
33 
There is a large research agenda here. 
The second issue has to do with the relationship between welfare and equity in the 
context of government regulation.  While promoting welfare is the basic goal of 
environmental regulation, there are important ethical constraints on the pursuit of that 
goal. Those constraints support some, but not all, of the moral reservations about CBA 
and WTP that are stressed by their critics.
34 As I have suggested, it would be 
unacceptable for government to adopt a higher VSL or VSLY for men and whites than 
for women and African-Americans. Related problems infect the use of QALYs in certain 
circumstances. Suppose, for example, that an otherwise identical government intervention 
                                                 
30 See id. 
31 Of course this is a difficult task, and I offer some thoughts here only about the easy cases. For general 
discussion, see Daniel Kahneman, et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q. J 
Econ 375 (1997). 
32 See id.; Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 162 (Papers 
and Proceedings) (2003); George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future 
Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, WellBeing: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology 85 (Russell Sage 1999). 
33 See Jonathan Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarettes Taxes Make Smo kers Happier? (2003, 
available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20030605.htm), for an empirical demonstration that higher 
taxes on cigarettes actually increase the happiness of smokers, apparently because smoking decreases  
happiness and taxes decrease smoking. One of the many intriguing features of this essay is this: People are 
willing to pay for cigarettes, and thus in order to smoke, but smoking decreases welfare (on almost any 




could produce more QALYs if directed at the moderately disabled than at the severely 
disabled; is it so clear that the intervention should therefore favor the moderately 
disabled? An understanding of the nature and the weaknesses of the ethical objections to 
VSLY helps explain the strength of objections to the promotion of welfare through 
regulation in other settings. 
Finally, I hope to make some progress in clarifying the debate between those who 
emphasize WTP and those who emphasize life-years and QALYs.
35 I suggest that 
QALYs can be used as part of a cost-effectiveness analysis; it would be fully possible to 
investigate how many QALYs can be obtained for a given investment of resources. But 
when mortality and morbidity gains are converted into monetary equivalents, QALYs are 
insufficiently informative. The value of WTP is that it allows for the conversion.  In some 
circumstances, affected people might be willing to pay a large amount for relatively few 
QALYs––if, for example, they are wealthy or inclined to spend much of their wealth on 
risk-reduction. In other circumstances, affected people might be willing to pay a small 
amount for relatively many QALYs––if, for example, they are poor or inclined to spend 
little of their wealth on risk-reduction. In fact this seemingly paradoxical result––higher 
WTP for few QALYs than for many––is far from unlikely. There is no question that other 
things being equal, more QALYs are better than fewer. But where the beneficiaries of 
regulation would pay all or almost all of its cost, WTP is normally the appropriate 
measure of benefits.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Part II discusses the choice 
between life-years and lives. It urges that life-years are the appropriate focus of 
regulatory concern. It also discusses some of the complexities in monetizing life-years. 
Part III, the heart of the essay, explores ethical and distributive constraints on the 
promotion of welfare through regulation. It shows that the relevant constraints do not 
argue against the use of life-years and VSLY and that if any illicit discrimination is 
involved, it is in the use of statistical lives and VSL. Part IV briefly identifies some 
options for policy. Part V is the conclusion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 See Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Priceless: Human Health, the Environment, and the Limits of 




II.  Lengthening Lives and WTP 
 
Should government focus on statistical lives or instead statistical life-years? It is 
important to be clear on the nature of the opposition between the two. No regulatory 
program can eliminate death; if it is successful, it will merely extend life. If regulators 
focus solely on statistical lives, they will be lengthening lives, and they will be analyzing 
the consequences of regulation without regard to the extent of the lengthening. In fact 
they will be blinding themselves to that intuitively relevant consideration. The initial 
question, then, is whether regulators should focus on statistical lives rather than life-
years, even while acknowledging the fact that life extension is all that is involved.  
 
A. Welfare and Life Extension 
It should be clear that an emphasis on statistical lives ignores highly pertinent 
information. Other things being equal, and as a matter of simple logic, the welfare gain 
from a program saving (say) 1000 people between forty and sixty-five is unquestionably 
higher than the welfare gain from a program saving (say) 1000 people who are 65 and 
over. The former program does everything that the latter program does, and much else 
besides. After all, the sixty-five year-olds were themselves forty once, and it would be 
astonishing if the welfare gain, to each of us, of ten more years of life were equivalent to 
the welfare gain of forty more years of life.  
Nor does an emphasis on life-years disregard or downplay the welfare of older 
people. Once programs focussing on life-years are in place, old people will benefit from 
them no less than younger people, simply because those programs benefited them at a 
younger stage and hence increased the likelihood that they would become old.
36 In this 
sense, the idea that a life-years approach prefers younger people over older people is 
based on a kind of optical illusion––one that sees human life as a snapshot with everyone 
always at their current age, rather than a moving picture in which people age over time.  
                                                                                                                                                 
35 For an overview, see James Hammitt, QALYs vs. WTP, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (2002). 
36 There is one exception to this conclusion: People who became old while government used VSL but after 
it switches to VSLY. Such people could not, by hypothesis, benefit from VSLY when they were younger. 
But it would be extremely odd to invoke this short-term problem as a reason to continue with VSL if it is 




To see the claim for considering life-years, imagine that people are placed behind 
a veil of ignorance,
37 in which they do not know their personal characteristics; they are 
unaware of their race, sex, wealth, or (most pertinently) age. Would such people be 
indifferent between a program that would eliminate risks that people would face at forty 
and one that would eliminate identical risks faced at sixty? If people do not know how 
old they are, would they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better to 
eliminate a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by 
one million social security recipients? Or consider the following question: 
 
  You do not know how long you will live. Which of the following two programs do 
you prefer?: 
(a) A program that would eliminate, starting now and for the rest of your life after 
that point, a 1/50,000 risk of death.    
(b) A program that would eliminate, starting at sixty-five and for the rest of your 
life after that point, a 1/50,000 risk of death. 
 
It would be truly astonishing if most people did not prefer (a) over (b). Perhaps a 
preference for (a) reflects, in part, the discounting of future years, which (rationally or 
not
38) may not loom so large in people’s current calculations.
39 But the difference is 
highly likely to reflect not merely discounting but also the fact that (a) provides more 
risk-free years. In answering questions of this kind, reasonable people take account of the 
fact that the welfare benefit of (a) is significantly higher than the welfare benefit of (b). In 
fact (a) literally dominates (b): It provides everything that (b) does, and more years of 
reduced risk as well. 
 
                                                 
37 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
38 On hyberbolic discounting, see David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, Encyclopedia of 
Cognitive Science (forthcoming), available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laibson/papers/euler.pdf ;  David Laibson and Christopher Harris, 
Hyberbolic Discounting and Consumption, available at id.; Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse (1993). 





These points suggest that government should consider life-years saved, not 
merely lives saved.
40 And if life-years are the focus, it would be possible to engage in 
cost-effectiveness analysis, seeing how many life-years are obtained for given 
investments in regulatory protection. Government might therefore reallocate resources 
devoted to programs protecting the elderly to programs protecting younger people.
41 But 
suppose that government seeks to engage not merely in cost- effectiveness analysis but 
also in cost-benefit analysis. If this is what it seeks to do, it will have to turn life-years 
into monetary equivalents. For most economists, the valuation of regulatory benefits, and 
the monetization of life-years, depends on WTP.
42 Should WTP be used here?  
            My basic suggestion here is that the use of WTP, as a way of monetizing benefits, 
creates no special or novel issues in the context of life-years. I do not intend to reach any 
final conclusions here about the place of WTP in regulatory policy; my tentative 
conclusion is that as a general rule, government should indeed use its ordinary methods to 
calculate WTP for life-years. But I do address an apparent paradox: It is possible that 
WTP would actually be higher to protect older people than  younger people––if and 
because older people are willing to pay more to eliminate statistical risks than younger 
people. This is a paradox, because it suggests that WTP might be higher to produce lower 
gains in terms of life years. One of my goals is to explain how and why this might be so. I 
also suggest that whether for lives or for life-years, WTP has its strongest claims in cases 
in which the beneficiaries of regulation must also pay for it. Finally, I explore an issue for 
which the life-years debate can be seen as an opening wedge: whether government should 
                                                 
40 There are some exotic variations that I do not deal with here. Compare two programs. (1) Program A 
would save 50 people who are ten years old. (2) Program B would save 100 people who are forty-six years 
old. If life expectancy is 80, then the first program would save 3500 life-years, whereas the second would 
save 3400 life-years. Is it so clear that program A is to be preferred? If not, it might be because reasonable 
people would prefer something like a weighted average of lives saved and life-years saved, so that a large 
number of people, and a small number of life-years, would receive more attention than life-years alone 
suggest, just as a small number of people, and a large number of life-years, would receive less attention. I 
do not deal with that possibility here. If government concentrated on life-years for purposes of regulation, it 
is likely that this issue would balance out in the end. The area of medical treatment is one in which the 
issue might have more practical importance. 
41 This would be an extension of the reallocations aimed at in Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 
(1993). 
42 See, e.g., V. Kerry Smith, Do the “Near” Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently? (unpublished 




use a uniform WTP or instead a highly variable one, making numerous distinctions 
according to context. But let us begin with some basics. 
1. WTP and VSL in general. Advocates of the WTP criterion urge that as a 
measure of welfare, WTP has the promise of administrability.
43 While it is not always 
simple to calculate WTP, market measures and contingent valuation studies provide a 
great deal of information. The government has placed heavy reliance on labor market 
studies, which suggest a WTP in the general range of $6.1 million.
44 These studies 
purport to show that in the market, people receive a certain level of compensation to run 
statistical risks, revealing an ascertainable “price” for potential hazards.
45 In ordinary 
markets, there is a market for safety, with some products (like Volvos) receiving higher 
prices partly because they reduce statistical risks. People are willing to pay specified 
amounts for risk reduction. In one view, markets provide relevant information about 
appropriate prices, and regulators should draw on that information, refusing to force 
people to buy more than they would (if well-informed). Of course it is possible to 
question existing studies on various grounds and to ask whether real-world data actually 
reveal people’s WTP for increases in safety.
46 Contingent valuation studies, asking 
people how much they are willing to pay for such increases, might seem to produce more 
reliable answers, simply because the answers to such questions are far less “noisy” than 
market behavior. But contingent valuation studies raise serious problems of their own.
47 
 
                                                 
43 The point should not be overstated. Studies of WTP show a great deal of variability. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255 (2002) (showing a range from $1 million to $14 
million), and a recent study, based on 1990s data, suggests that the current figure of $6.1 million might well 
be doubled. See W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of A Statistical Life (2003), 
available on ssrn.com. (finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males). 
44 See Sunstein, supra note. 
45 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 30 J 
Econ Lit 1912 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph Aldy, The Value of A Statistical Life: A Critical Review,  
J Risk and Uncertainty (forthcoming 2003). 
46 See, e.g., William T. Dickens, Differences between Risk Premiums in Union and Nonunion Wages and 
the Case for Occupational Safety Regulation, 74 Am Econ Rev 320 (1984) (dividing workers between 
union and nonunion sectors and using the results to doubt the idea of compensating wage differentials); 
William T. Dickens, Assuming the Can Opener: Hedonic Wage Estimates and the Value of Life, in A 
Hedonics Primer for Economists and Attorneys 145 (1992) (generally challenging those estimates); Peter 
Dorman, Markets and Mortality (1996) (same). 
47 See Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number, 




Let us assume that these difficulties can be solved and that existing studies can 
indeed measure people’s WTP for increases in safety. There is certainly a connection 
between WTP and welfare. The more that someone is willing to pay for a benefit, the 
more likely it is that the benefit would actually promote that person’s welfare. But if 
welfare is our guide, the WTP criterion might be criticized on several grounds. Consider 
a few: 
1.  Willingness to pay is dependent on ability to pay. As a result, poor people 
might be unwilling to pay much for a regulatory benefit even though they 
would greatly gain from it, and wealthy people might be willing to pay a great 
deal for a regulatory benefit even though they would receive very little from 
it.  
2.  Some people lack relevant information, and hence they might not be willing to 
pay for goods that would, in fact, produce significant welfare benefits for 
them. They might also be willing to pay a great deal for goods that would not, 
in fact, produce significant welfare benefits for them. It is well-documented 
that people’s welfare judgments at time of decision (“anticipated welfare”) do 
not always match their experience (“experience welfare”).
48 
3.  People’s preferences might have adapted to deprivation or injustice.
49 Hence 
they might be unwilling to pay anything for goods from which they would 
benefit.  If government relies on WTP, it will not engage in actions that might 
turn out to be welfare-promoting.  
4.  As I have noted, measures of WTP rely on hedonic pricing or contingent 
valuation studies that elicit monetary amounts from individuals, with the 
apparent assumption that such individuals will be paying those amounts 
whether or not other people are doing so as well.
50 But people care about their 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and J. Snell, Predicting Changing Taste: Do People Know What They Will 
Like?, 5 J. Behavioral Decision Making 187 (1992); George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn't It 
Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, 
WellBeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85 (Russell Sage 1999). 
49 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2002); 
Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985). 




relative economic position, not simply their absolute economic position,
51 and 
hence they would be likely to be willing to pay significantly more if they 
could be assured that others would be paying for the regulatory benefit as 
well. The reason is that when everyone is paying for the benefit, people can 
maintain their relative economic position while also receiving the benefit. 




I do not intend to come to terms with these problems here; I will bracket the more 
general challenges to WTP itself and assess the questions here within the existing 
framework, in which WTP plays a central role. But it is noteworthy that actual agency 
use of WTP does not run afoul of most of these problems.
53 The most important point 
here is agencies do not give a lower VSL for poor people than for rich people; they use a 
uniform figure.
54  
2. WTP and age: evidence. If WTP is the proper measure of VSLY, it would 
follow that in order to convert life-years into monetary equivalents, regulators should 
investigate how much people, at various stages of life, are willing to pay for years of risk 
reduction. In principle, WTP might or might not vary over the lifespan; there is no good a 
priori answer to that question. Perhaps studies would show that older people are willing 
to pay more for each of their remaining life-years than younger people are willing to pay 
for each of theirs––so that even if we focus on life-years, the “remainder of life” for older 
people is as high as or even higher than that for younger people. Imagine, for example, 
that people who are 65 and over are not willing to pay less to eliminate a life-time risk of 
1/500,000 than are people who are 40 and under. We could speculate about different 
possible results here. Perhaps labor market studies would show that the value of a 
                                                 
51 See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (1999). 
52 See Frank and Sunstein, supra note.  
53 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are 
Distorted, in Cost-Benefit Analysis 269 (Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner eds. 2001). 
54 See id. Note that it would be reasonable to do exactly that in the context of forced exchanges. Unless 
there is some informational problem, poor people are not helped when regulation forces them to pay $200 
for a benefit that is worth only $50 to them. In such cases, perhaps government should impose regulation 




statistical life steadily decreases over the life-span
55; perhaps they would show that VSL 
steadily increases; perhaps VSL rises to a certain age and declines thereafter. On one 
view, the right question for purposes of policy is what well-designed studies actually 
establish.  
Consider a recent investigation that attempts to resolve exactly that issue.
56 The 
study asked respondents in the United States and Canada to state their willingness to pay 
for risk reductions of 1-in-1000 and 5-in-1000. Demographic information was collected, 
so that the authors could hold constant relevant variables (such as health and wealth).  A 
key finding is that in the United States, age had no impact on WTP. In the 1-in-1000 
condition, VSL estimates exceeded $4 million; the estimates were less than half that in 
the 5-in-1000 condition.
57 But in both cases, older people did not show a lower WTP than 
younger people. For Canada, age generally had no effect, but with one exception: people 
over 70 were willing to pay about one-third less than others for risk reduction.
58 The 
authors conclude that in general, their results support government’s “current practice with 
regard to treatment of age,”
59 because they suggest that WTP does not vary across the 
lifespan. 
Or consider another study based on labor market data.
60 The simple result is that 
older workers require significantly higher, not lower, compensation to accept increase in 
fatality risks on the job. For the full sample, the estimated VSL is $5.31 million, well 
within the range of existing EPA figures.
61 The authors actually find that VSL increases 
with age, from $7.4 million for workers between 51 and 55, to $10.2 million for workers 
between 56 and 60, to $14 million for workers between 61 and 65.
62 The implication is 
that regulatory policy should give a higher monetary value to statistical risks faced by 
older people. Instead of a “senior death discount,” regulators should use a “youth death 
discount.” If the findings in this study are right, the “remainder of life” is actually worth 
                                                 
55 For a result in this general direction, see Viscusi and Aldy, supra note. 
56 See Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? Evidence  
from the United States and Canada (unpublished manuscript 2002), available at 
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDF_files/0219.pdf. 
57 See id. at 14. 
58 See id. at 16. 
59 Id. at17. 
60 See Smith et al., supra note, available at http://www.rff.org/valuinghealthoutcomes/VHO_Readings.htm. 
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more to older people, even though they have fewer life-years left. Any exercise of 
multiplication––of life-years times VSLY––would actually result in higher numbers for 
those who are older, notwithstanding what I have said above about welfare.  
3. WTP and age: possible explanations. I do not mean to say here whether the 
particular findings in these two studies are convincing. Other studies find that older 
people show a lower VSL than younger people do.
63 This finding seems intuitive, simply 
because older people have fewer years to protect. But if VSL does not decline with age, it 
remains to explain why.
64 The simplest answer is that older people have less to do with 
their money and hence lower opportunity costs (unless the bequest motive is very strong). 
Because fewer years of life remain, savings are not a high priority, and older people have 
less, in general, on which to use their resources. But the full story is somewhat 
speculative and certainly more complex.  
A possible contributing factor is wealth itself: If older people have more income 
than younger people, their WTP will be higher, and for reasons that have nothing to do 
with welfare. Some of the studies, finding no age differences in WTP, do control for 
income.
65 But they do not control for wealth, which is an important missing variable. 
Older people have more savings even if they have lower incomes, and hence the higher 
WTP might reflect a wealth effect. (Recall that wealthy people will show a higher WTP 
simply because they have more money.) There is a complementary explanation. It might 
be that older people have a comparatively high WTP––as high as or higher than that of 
younger people––because they have fewer years left in which to spend. Suppose, for 
example, that people over sixty are willing to pay $100 to eliminate a risk of 1/50,000, 
whereas people under forty are willing to pay only $75 to eliminate such a risk. It may be 
that the younger people want to use their disposable income on other things, including 
savings (of less use to the elderly
66), whereas for older people, the reduction of risk is a 
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high priority. In short, older people have lower opportunity costs. Unless the bequest 
motive is powerful, they will be especially willing to use what they have to reduce 
statistical risks. 
This possibility is related to another one: The comparatively high WTP for older 
people might reflect the preciousness of the relatively fewer years that remain. Consider 
two questions: 
 
(a) You are 75 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to avoid a 20 
percent chance of dying one year earlier than you otherwise would? 
(b) You are 25 years old. How much would you be willing to pay to avoid a 20 
percent chance of dying one year earlier than you otherwise would? 
 
It is easily imaginable that question (a) would produce a far higher WTP than 
question (b), for respondents answering hypothetically, and even more predictably for 
respondents who are actually 75 and 25 respectively. It may well be that the perceived 
value of any given year increases, for some or many, when the number of remaining 
years declines. For people who are 25, the prospect of losing one year of life might not 
loom terribly large, and for people who are 75, that loss is probably a matter of major 
importance. Undoubtedly the different answers are a product of discounting, rational or 
otherwise. And in some cases, the absence of age-related differences in WTP might well 
be a product of the contingent valuation setting. Some studies of contingent valuation 
show “scope neglect”: people are willing to pay the same to protect 1000, 10,000, and 
100,000 migratory birds.
67 The absence of an age effect may reflect a similar 
phenomenon. It is possible that in contingent valuation studies or in market behavior, the 
number of years is “telescoped” into a kind of single unit, called “the rest of life.”  Hence 
the amount that people are willing to pay for a 1/500,000 risk of losing “the rest of life” 
might not much vary across the life-span.  
It is also possible that older people are generally risk-averse, and differences in 
risk preferences might help account for differences in WTP. Other things being equal, it 
is imaginable that older people would pay more to reduce an annual risk of 1/500,000 




probability risks. According to expected utility theory, risk-related judgments are made 
by multiplying the extent of the harm by its probability; according to prospect theory, 
people are generally risk-averse with respect to low-probability risks of catastrophe.
68 
Perhaps older people are, with respect to such risks, even more risk-averse than the 
population median. For present purposes, it is not necessary to choose among these 
various explanations. My central point is that there are plausible reasons that WTP might 
not decline with remaining life-years. 
5. Using WTP? Regulation as f orced exchanges.  Now let us turn to the central 
question of valuation. I have suggested that government should focus on life-years rather 
than lives. But should life-years be valued by using WTP for them? My ultimate 
conclusion is that they should. The case for using WTP for statistical life-years is not 
weaker than the case for using WTP for statistical lives. But there are a number of 
complexities here, and they illuminate some of the virtues and vices of using WTP in 
general. 
Begin with the simplest set of cases:  Those in which the cost of the regulatory 
benefit is entirely borne by those who are supposed to benefit from it. I suggest that in 
this set of cases, WTP is generally the appropriate measure  unless an informational 
problem or cognitive error is distorting people’s assessments.
69  
To see why, compare two programs: 
(a) Program A would mostly benefit people thirty years old and under. The 
median WTP, for such people, is $50 to eliminate a lifetime statistical risk 
of 1/200,000.  
(b)  Program B would mostly benefit people sixty-five and older. The median 
WTP, for such people, is $100 to eliminate a lifetime statistical risk of 
1/200,000.  
                                                                                                                                                 
67 See Daniel Kahneman and Jack Knetch, Valuing Public Goods, 22 J. Env Econ and Mgt. 57 (1992). 
68 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in 
Choices, Values, and Frames 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman ed. 2000); for a clear discussion with application to 
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Suppose that in both cases, the full cost of the benefit would be paid by those who 
receive it. I have argued that the welfare benefit of program A is higher than the welfare 
benefit of program B. But it does not follow that the government should adopt a more 
expensive regulation to implement program A than to implement program B. So long as 
the beneficiaries of both programs would pay their full cost, so long as there are no third-
party effects, and so long as people’s WTP is not distorted by informational problems or 
cognitive errors, government should not impose a cost of over $50 on those who would 
benefit from program A. At the same time, it should be willing to impose a cost of up to 
$100 on those who would benefit from program B.  
            Under the analysis I am suggesting, government should be willing to impose more 
costly and aggressive regulations in cases in which the anticipated welfare gain (on one 
side of the equation) is lower. Is this a paradox? It is not. Consider two other programs: 
(a) Program C would reduce a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by poor people, 
whose median WTP is $10. 
(b) Program D would reduce a risk of 1/200,000, faced mostly by wealthy people, 
whose median WTP is $50. 
Under plausible assumptions, program C and program D would produce identical 
welfare gains. In the abstract, there is no reason to think that wealthy people gain more 
than do poor people from the elimination of a statistical risk. But in light of the fact that 
they have little money, the payment of $10 is worse for poor people than for wealthy 
people; hence the welfare loss of paying $10 is higher for them. This point explains the 
difference in WTP. Program C might well give its beneficiaries the welfare equivalent of 
program D; but insofar as program C is taking money from those same beneficiaries, it is 
removing more welfare, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, than program D does. If the 
beneficiaries of program C are being asked to pay for it, government should not require 
them to pay more than their WTP. 
As a general rule, the same conclusion applies to WTP over the life-span. 
Government should not require younger people to “buy” more regulatory protection than 
they believe to be in their interests. Note here that such protection is, in a sense, a form of 
insurance. If younger people are not willing to pay much for such insurance, government 




problem with their decisions. Now it is entirely possible that some such problem is at 
work. Young people might be acting as if low-probability events are worth no concern at 
all, or they might be engaged in a form of hyberbolic discounting for risks that will come 
to fruition in what seems to be the irrelevantly distant future.
70 But unless a problem of 
this kind can be identified, WTP is the appropriate measure in cases in which regulation 
is a forced exchange.  Note that in a sense, informational and cognitive problems are 
avoided if government uses a uniform VSL or VSLY. Under that practice, government 
calculates the likely mortality gains and multiples them by some general WTP, 
abstracting from the situation at h and.
71 It does not inquire into individual WTP in 
particular circumstances. While this refusal to individuate may lead to inaccuracy––a 
point I take up below––it also avoids certain problems with obtaining and processing 
information. 
5. When the beneficiaries of regulation do not pay its full cost. But it is frequently 
the case that the beneficiaries of regulatory protection pay little or none of its cost.
72 
What should be done in that event
73? Here the analysis is more complex. To see the 
problem, suppose that people who are under thirty would pay a median of $50 to 
eliminate a risk of 1/200,000, that the aggregate cost of eliminating that risk is $55, but 
that the beneficiaries would pay only $10 of that amount, with the remainder of the cost 
being borne by others (say, consumers and employees). This program is, by hypothesis, 
inefficient, because the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits. But it might well 
be justified on grounds of overall welfare; to answer that question, we would need to 
answer some difficult questions about how to measure the welfare effects of the program. 
And in terms of the welfare of the possible beneficiaries of the regulation, the question is 
much easier. If they are paying only $10 for benefits valued at $50, they are net gainers. 
It follows that if social planners are particularly interested in the welfare of the possible 
beneficiaries, the program is justified.  
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  But there is an obvious response. To assist the relevant population, it would be 
better to give them a cash subsidy rather than to provide them with a regulatory benefit 
that is, by hypothesis, less valuable to them than it is costly to those who must provide it. 
And under plausible assumptions, a subsidy would indeed be better than a regulatory 
benefit, both because it is more efficient and because it is a better means of 
accomplishing the redistributive goal. But if a subsidy is not forthcoming, it is certainly 
possible that provision of the regulatory benefit is preferable to the status quo on grounds 
of both welfare and distribution. 
  Unfortunately, no simple conclusion follows for purposes of regulatory policy. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve the problem in order to decide between lives 
and life-years. There is no particular reason for government to subsidize older people 
rather than younger. If the life-years approach ends up valuing younger people more than 
older people (because they have more life-years left), the older people have no claim for 
special government help. But we can reach some more general conclusions about WTP 
and regulatory policy. If the beneficiaries of regulation pay its full cost, and if there is no 
informational or cognitive problem, WTP provides the correct figure. If the beneficiaries 
of regulation do not pay its full cost, regulation might be justified even if it exceeds WTP. 
For purposes of policy, one problem is that in many cases, government cannot easily 
determine how much of the cost of regulation is borne by its purported beneficiaries. 
With perfect tools, regulators would have a complete sense of the incidence of regulatory 
costs, and an understanding of the distribution of benefits and burdens would be helpful 
in making regulatory choices.
74 But government lacks those tools. The best approach is 
probably to begin with WTP to measure the value of statistical life-years, and then to 
make distributional adjustments in appropriate cases.
75 Along these dimensions, the 
analysis of statistical life-years does not differ from the analysis of statistical lives. 
  Of course government does not lack control over the distributional incidence of 
efforts to protect safety, health, and the environment. Government might provide a 
benefit for free, perhaps by accompanying regulation with a cash payment to those who 
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are supposed to benefit. But an analysis of this possibility would take me well beyond the 
present discussion.
76 For reasons I have given, older people, as such, are not a strong 
candidate for cash subsidies, even if their WTP turns out to be relatively low under a 
VSLY approach. 
6. Uniformity and disaggregation in monetary valuation: a relevant digression. 
Government agencies tend to use a uniform VSL. Proposals for the use of VSLY tend to 
use a uniform number or a number that makes only simple, crude distinctions––between, 
say, people under and over 65.
77 But we can make some conceptual progress here, and 
eventually practical progress as well, if we recognize that if government had perfect 
information, and if it could individuate regulatory benefits, its valuations would be much 
more fine-grained. In fact the use of VSLY, as opposed to VSL, can be seen as an initial 
step toward more in the way of individuation. To put the point in the simplest terms: To 
the extent that the beneficiaries of regulation bear its costs, a perfectly informed 
government would use a perfectly individuated WTP, giving people precisely the level of 
protection that they deem to be in their interests with respect to the risk in question.
78  
It follows that a uniform VSL, or a uniform VSLY, is not easy to justify. It can be 
supported partly on the ground that government lacks the tools to bring about sufficient 
individuation across either people or risks. With their various endowments and 
preferences, individuals show a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to statistical 
hazards. We have seen that wealthy people will pay more than poor people; risk-averse 
people will of course pay more than risk-inclined people. In addition, social risks, even 
risks of death, are hardly all the same. Many people are risk- averse with respect to some 
hazards but risk-inclined with respect to others. In deciding whether to be risk-averse, 
numerous distinctions might be deemed relevant. People might reasonably distinguish, 
for example, between a risk of death from cancer and a risk of death from heart disease, 
and they might also distinguish among workplace risks, risks of motor vehicle accidents, 
and risks associated with air pollution.
79 If government were omniscient, it would 
individuate regulatory programs along all these dimensions. And if regulatory tools could 
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be perfectly individuated, government would provide every individual with regulatory 
protection that perfectly matched his preferences and hence his situation-specific WTP––
assuming, again, that people are being forced to pay the cost of that protection.
80 There 
would be no single VSL or VSLY; the relevant values would be highly particular to 
persons and situations. 
Why, then, does government rely on such crude population-wide, risk-invariant
81 
measures? One reason is that it lacks good information about the WTP of subgroups; 
another reason is that for many regulatory programs, it must simultaneously protect large 
populations. In these circumstances, a decision to adopt subgroup-specific WTP would be 
hard to defend  unless the program in question would benefit and burden mostly or 
entirely classes of people who could be defined in terms of those subgroup 
characteristics. As knowledge grows, it might be expected that less uniform numbers will 
be used in the future.
82 I cannot discuss that issue in any detail here, but the shift from 
VSL to VSLY can be seen as a small but unmistakable movement in that direction. 
 
C. Extensions: Welfare vs. WTP 
I have suggested that WTP is the proper starting-place for policy judgments about 
how to monetize statistical life-years. But I have also indicated that in the face of a 
problem of information or cognition, the argument for relying on WTP is greatly 
weakened.  And indeed, a growing body of literature shows that at the time of decision, 
people often mispredict the welfare effects of one or another option.
83 For example, 
assistant professors often exaggerate the effects of a denial of tenure on their well-being a 
year after the decision.
84 In general, people overestimate the adverse consequences of 
setbacks, to which they are frequently able to adapt.
85 In the context of environmental and 
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social changes, an empirical study shows pervasive exaggerations of likely consequences 
for quality of life.
86  
It follows that in some contexts, WTP will mispredict the lived consequences of 
choices. “The evidence of grave deficiencies in taste predictions appears to pose a 
significant challenge to many applications of the rational-agent model.”
87 Some of these 
deficiencies stem from a failure to appreciate the possibility of adaptation to change; 
some of them are a product of an exaggerated sense of the effect any single factor on 
well-being.
88 What I am adding here is that WTP will be a poor proxy for welfare in 
cases in which we have good reason to suppose that underestimation or overestimation 
are likely. Of course government officials should be reluctant to second-guess citizens, 
but in some cases, the second-guessing is well-justified. 
Consider an example: A reliable contingent valuation study shows that people are 
willing to pay far more to prevent a long cancer death than to prevent a sudden 
unanticipated death, with death from heart disease falling somewhere in the middle.
89 As 
it happens, the median WTP for a sudden unanticipated death is half the median WTP for 
a cancer death.
90 Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of policy, assuming that 
the contingent valuation study is reliable
91?  I suggest that they should not be if we have 
reason to believe that the WTP figures are not accurately measuring welfare. And is it 
even plausible to think that the “cancer premium” is so high that it actually doubles the 
cost of death? Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually twice as bad as 
a death that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure, a degree of pain and suffering 
typically accompanies cancer, but it is not easy to defend the set of (exotic) values that 
would lead to the conclusion that the relevant pain and suffering is as bad as death 
itself.
92  I believe that WTP is not measuring welfare here, and that the inflated numbers 
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for cancer deaths is a product of an intuitive recoil at the idea of cancer, one that leads to 
unrealistically high monetary values.  
Perhaps this example can be disputed. If so, consider the fact that according to 
some studies of WTP, a curable cancer is valued at $2.3 million, more than a third the 
value of a statistical life.
93 Suppose that these studies are reliable and that $2.3 million 
really does capture people’s WTP for a curable cancer.
94 Is it plausible to think that the 
welfare loss from a curable cancer is more than a third of the welfare loss from death? 
More likely, the frightening idea of “cancer” is driving people’s judgments, in a way that 
leads to a WTP that does not accurately measure the welfare loss from a curable cancer. 
This is an example of a situation in which “decision utility” (anticipated utility at the time 
of decision) does not match “experience utility” (the actual utility of lived experience).
95  
There are many other illustrations, as, for example, when people show a high WTP to 
avoid an injury that is not so terrible in actual experience.
96 In short, WTP is sometimes a 
poor proxy for welfare. Because that issue does not directly bear on the choice between 
VSL and VSLY, I will not discuss it in detail here. But I do suggest that the point holds 
out a warning for the use of WTP studies to assess statistical risks, especially in the 
domain of morbidity. 
 
III. Ethics 
  Thus far my principal suggestion has been that regulators should focus on life-
years rather than lives, generally answering questions of monetization by reference to 
WTP. But a distinctive objection to use of statistical life-years, and VSLY, is ethical in 
nature. The question is whether a form of illicit discrimination lies behind a decision to 
treat statistical lives of the elderly as less valuable (literally) than those of people who are 
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97 I urge here that illicit discrimination is not involved. In fact the use of VSL is 
far more plausibly discriminatory than the use of VSLY, because the former treats the 
remaining life-years of old people as more valuable than the remaining life-years of 
young people.
98 But to approach this question, let us begin with cases in which ethical 
constraints on the pursuit of welfare seem most insistent. 
 
A. Ethical Checks: Race and Sex Discrimination 
  Suppose that we could measure welfare directly through a kind of hedometer. 
Suppose too that the hedometer does not rely on contentious conceptions of welfare; it is 
not narrowly limited to pleasure or happiness, and it includes the proper ingredients of 
welfare however these are defined.
99 Suppose too that the hedometer is able to show that 
a program that would save fifty white people (from cancer as a result of arsenic in 
drinking water, for example) will produce greater welfare gains than a program that 
would save sixty African-Americans (from air pollution in the inner city, for example). 
Certainly it is not unimaginable that the welfare gain is higher for programs that protect 
whites than for programs that protect an equivalent number of African-Americans 
(though the opposite might also be true). Gender differences are possible as well. Perhaps 
men flourish more than women (though here too the opposite might be true). If these 
examples seem too contentious, imagine that there are two social groups, the Flourishing 
and the Depressed. Members of both groups are easily identifiable, and their present and 
future welfare is captured in the names of their respective groups. By stipulation, a 
program that protects the lives of the Flourishing will produce more welfare than one that 
protects the lives of the Depressed. To sharpen the normative question, stipulate too that 
the Flourishing are responsible for the depression of the Depressed; that if not for the 
active efforts of the Flourishing, the Depressed would come closer to flourishing too. 
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This example is hypothetical and we lack hedometers. Let us turn to WTP 
instead.
100 W. Kip Viscusi finds that African-American males have a significantly lower 
WTP than white males: $7.7 million versus $15.1 million.
101 He also finds that African-
American females have a lower WTP than white females: $8.7 million versus $11.3.
102 
Thus the overall VSL for the white sample is $13.4 million, whereas the overall VSL for 
the African-American sample is $9.3 million, and the VSL for the male sample is $15.1, 
much higher than the VSL of $11.3 for the female sample.
103 If WTP is the basis for 
government policy, agencies should be assigning a much higher VSL for whites and men 
than for African-Americans and women. Viscusi himself does not reach this conclusion. 
He says that “because of differences in market opportunities, it is inappropriate to 
attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness of black workers to bear risk.”  
Of course the WTP numbers do not show or even suggest that when regulatory 
programs save lives, African-Americans and women gain less, in terms of welfare, than 
whites and men. By itself, the lower WTP demonstrates no such thing; recall that WTP is 
merely a proxy for welfare, and an especially crude one in the face of disparities in 
income, wealth, and opportunities. Suppose that Donald Trump is willing to pay $500 to 
eliminate 1/50,000 risk of having migraine headaches for the next year; suppose too that I 
am willing to pay only $25 to eliminate the same risk. The difference might well stem 
only from differences in wealth; the welfare loss, from migraine headaches, would be the 
same for the both of us. But it is certainly imaginable that some people, defined in 
demographic terms, do obtain more welfare from their lives than others. To see whether 
there are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare through regulation, let us simply 
stipulate that this is the case. 
  Should government devote more resources to the protection of those racial or 
ethnic groups that would gain more welfare from protection? Most people would find the 
very question absurd. In cases of these sorts, there is an equality-based check on the 
pursuit of greater welfare. In fact racial discrimination on t his basis would be 
unconstitutional. But what is the source of the equality-based check? We should begin by 
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noting that there is nothing inevitable, or neutral, or uncontroversial in the suggestion that 
government should always promote welfare as such. To say that it should do so is itself to 
take a controversial ethical position. In the context of race discrimination, a central 
problem is that if African-Americans receive less welfare from their lives than do white 
people, a large part of the reason lies in social and legal practices, past and present, which 
help produce that state of affairs. This form of inequality reflects injustice. If government 
takes the inequality as a kind of given for the purposes of policy, it is compounding the 
injustice, creating a kind of vicious circle, in which disparities in welfare justify increased 
disparities in welfare, which in turn justify ever-increasing disparities in welfare. The 
ethical intuition is simple: Where disparities in the welfare effects of regulatory policies 
are a product of background injustice, government is properly blocked from taking those 
disparities into account. 
  This point has implications for the debate over the use of quality-adjusted life 
years in regulatory policy. Insofar as the idea of QALYs is designed to rank health gains 
along with fatalities averted, it makes a great deal of sense; reductions in curable cancers, 
asthma attacks, and chronic bronchitis surely count as gains, whoever receives them. But 
suppose that people with severe physical and emotional ailments can be benefited only 
moderately by protective interventions––and hence that the number of QALYs, from 
such interventions, is relatively. Should government concentrate instead on programs for 
people with less severe ailments? If government should not, it is because it is unjust to 
disfavor those whose aliments are most serious.
104 This problem is not the same as the 
problem of disparities across lines of race and gender, but it raises related concerns. 
 
B. Two Complexities for Equity 
  But there are two natural rebuttals to this argument.  
1.  Forced exchanges. Recall that some kinds of regulation amount to forced 
exchanges: People have to bear the cost of the regulatory benefit. If 
African-Americans would have (say) a $6 million VSL, and if they are 
adequately informed, government does them no favors by assigning an $8 
million VSL. If it does so, it gives them a benefit for an amount for which 
                                                                                                                                                 




they are (rationally) unwilling to pay. Hence the equality-based objection 
to WTP is weak if used as a defense of a high VSL in cases in which the 
purported beneficiaries of regulation also have to pay for it. The point is 
important, but economically oriented analysts should not make too much 
of it.  Sometimes those who benefit from regulation pay only a fraction of 
its cost. And when a forced exchange is not in the interest of the purported 
beneficiaries of regulation, the best response is not necessarily to do 
nothing. Instead of a forced exchange, government might provide a 
subsidy––in the form, for example, of a program that delivers benefits 
while relieving the beneficiaries of the obligation to pay for it.
105 Such a 
program will be in the interest of those beneficiaries even if it delivers a 
benefit in excess of their willingness to pay for it. In any case there is an 
obvious question: Why, exactly, would government want to have a lower 
VSL (or VSLY) for African-Americans than for whites? Why would it 
divide social risks along racial lines? The only legitimate answer is that it 
is seeking to promote the welfare of all concerned––and that it believes 
that a uniform VSL will fail to accomplish that goal. But regulatory 
programs are not usually directed at classes that can be easily defined in 
racial terms. Hence a racial distinction, in terms of VSL or VSLY, seems 
pointless, a form of discrimination that would be gratuitous as well as 
invidious.
106 
2.  Redistribution, regulation, and taxes. In the face of background injustice, 
or indefensible inequality, it might be thought that the tax system should 
be used as a corrective, and that regulation should concern itself solely 
with promoting welfare.
107  On this view, there is no real problem with a 
VSL that discriminates on the basis of race or sex. If whites and men stand 
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to gain more welfare, regulatory policy should reflect this fact. The 
remedy for the indefensible inequality, if it exists, lies in tax and welfare 
policies that redress it directly. Regulation, in short, should involve 
maximization; redistributive tax and spending policies, rather than 
regulation, should be used to promote redistribution.
108 The issue is 
disputed.
109 But if it were possible to use tax and welfare policies to 
reduce inequalities between whites and African-Americans, that route 
should probably be preferred, as an engine of redistribution, to an 
approach that uses a uniform VSL or VSLY. But note that a uniform VSL 
or VSLY is itself a kind of redistributive strategy (imperfect to be sure),
110 
and that there is no broad social effort to combat the inequalities that give 
rise to the different v alues that I have described. In the absence of such 
efforts, government should not use different monetary values on the 
ground that those imaginable efforts would be better strategies of 
redistribution. 
 
C. Discrimination and Baselines 
Thus far I have suggested that considerations of justice constrain the promotion of 
welfare through regulatory controls. I have used the examples of race and sex 
discrimination as a way of identifying some principles that seem to me to deserve general 
acceptance. But is the idea of VSLY morally unacceptable in the same way as a VSL that 
discriminates on the basis of race or gender? The initial point is that it is hard to argue 
that injustice accounts for the welfare disparity between protection of a thirty-year-old 
and protection of a sixty-year-old. The disparity comes from the simple fact that younger 
people have more years left. Now that disparity might itself be an injustice if social 
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practices, or even nature, singled out certain groups of people and gave them shorter 
lives. Hence VSLY would indeed be problematic if it systematically burdened members 
of identifiable social groups (an issue to which I will return). But as the VSLY criterion is 
used, it is demographically neutral in both theory and practice.
111  
Under VSLY, older people are treated worse for only one reason: They are older. 
This is not an injustice. Every old person was young once, and every young person will 
be old too (if given the chance). If regulatory policy is based on VSLY, every person 
will, in a sense, be both benefited and burdened, and in exactly the same way. Indeed, 
every person will be both a beneficiary and a victim of the relevant discrimination. 
People––the same people—will be benefited when they are younger and burdened when 
they are older. It is hard to see how that form of discrimination is illicit. In fact it is not 
clear that it is a form of discrimination at all. Everyone’s life year counts as no less and 
no more than one. 
In an important sense, a focus on statistical lives is discriminatory, not a focus on 
statistical life-years. The former discriminates against younger people, simply because it 
treats each of their years as less valuable than those of older people. A program that uses 
statistical lives accords far more value to each remaining year of an old person’s life than 
to each remaining year of a young person’s life.
112 The point is not purely semantic. 
Suppose that we conclude that lifetime well-being is what matters, and that other things 
being equal, policies should not give some people more lifetime well-being than others. 
A policy that looks solely at statistical lives will violate this principle. Compare a group 
of people who die from a certain risk at fifty with a group of people who die from the 
same risk at seventy. Other things being equal, the latter group has received significantly 
more lifetime well-being than the former, and attention to statistical lives forces 
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government to ignore this fact.  If anything, an age-neutral statistical lives approach is 
subject to a claim of illicit discrimination, not an approach that focuses on life-years. 
 
D. Age Discrimination 
Do these arguments undermine the widely acceptable principle against age 
discrimination? If so, the arguments might be thought to have mischaracterized the 
ethical issues involved––or to have broad and perhaps radical implications. Under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
113 employers are forbidden from discriminating 
against people over forty. They cannot choose a thirty-year-old over a fifty-year-old. 
Indeed, they cannot discriminate even if they can claim that they are relying on a 
statistically sound generalization––as sound as those on which employers and others rely 
every day.
114 It is not acceptable for an employer to conclude that thirty-year-old teachers 
are more fit, energetic, and creative than fifty-year-old teachers, even if this is generally 
true, and even if it is difficult, in individual cases, to test creativity before people have 
started to work.
115 Nor would it be permissible for an employer to adapt the argument I 
have been defending here. An employer could not say that he wants to hire people who 
have a large number of life-years left -- even if the employer could say, not implausibly, 
that he would like employees with many life-years rather than fewer, and even if he could 
add, also not implausibly, that a life-years approach to hiring does not, in a sense, 
discriminate against anyone. (Recall that every older person was young once and that 
every younger person, if lucky, will eventually be older too.) The question, in short, is 
whether it is possible to defend the use of statistical life-years over statistical lives while 
also accepting the prohibition on age discrimination in employment. 
That prohibition does not have the same moral standing as the prohibition of race 
and sex discrimination in employment.
116 But it is easy to see how that prohibition might 
be justified. Some age discrimination is undoubtedly a product of unthinking prejudice––
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of a false belief that older people are unable to engage in certain tasks.
117 If prejudice is 
frequently responsible for age discrimination, perhaps age discrimination should 
generally be banned, at least if the ban does not have excessive social costs. A 
supplemental rationale would be that discrimination on the basis of age inflicts an 
unusual kind of dignitary harm—one that makes it different from, and worse than, most 
kinds of employment-related injury. If an employee is fired because he is fifty-five, or not 
hired for that reason, the psychological and dignitary injury is plausibly worse, even far 
worse, than that faced by people who are fired or hired for other reasons. At least this 
point seems to animate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
118 
The key point is that whether prejudice or dignitary harm is the basis of the 
ADEA, the same problems do not raise doubts about the government’s use of statistical 
life-years. When government uses life-years, it is not because it is prejudiced against 
older people or acting on the basis of unreliable stereotypes about them. There is no 
overgeneralization here. Nor is it easy to show that a dignitary harm, of the sort involved 
in the employment context, is an issue here. It is one thing to be told, by a specific 
employer, that you will be fired or not hired because you are too old. It is quite another 
thing for the government to use an approach that focuses on life-years rather than lives. 
To be sure, it is possible to characterize such an approach in a way that does inflict 
dignitary harm. Perhaps some objections to life-years stem from a perception that this 
measures values older people less, treating them as “worth” some fraction of younger 
people. But these objections rest on a highly misleading way of framing what life-years is 
all about. 
 
E. A Wrong Question 
Thus far I have urged that government should focus on statistical life-years rather 
than lives; that more welfare comes, other things being equal, from more life-years; that 
while the question of monetization is difficult to resolve, there is no general reason for 
government to depart from its ordinary practice of relying on private WTP; and that there 
is no ethical objection to a shift from statistical lives and VSL to statistical life-years and 
VSLY. But it might be tempting to respond that the choice between statistical lives and 
                                                 




VSL or statistical life-years and VSLY should be made not by asking people about their 
WTP, but by asking them their preferences between programs that focus on VSL or 
VSLY.
119 People might be asked if they believe that government should treat each 
averted fatality as no more and no less than one, or if government should instead consider 
the age of those whose lives are saved. If it turns out that people prefer life-years, then we 
might select appropriate numbers by asking subjects to choose between programs with 
different amounts for VSLY, or by seeing, through surveys, how people value life-years 
over the course of a lifespan. It might turn out, for example, that people consider each 
life-year as equivalent to (say) $200,000; or perhaps people will value life-years at a 
special premium when the beneficiaries are either especially old or especially young. In 
any case, the suggestion would be that policy should be set by consulting not WTP, but 
instead the public’s judgments about the appropriate values. 
This solution has some intuitive appeal; it seems responsive, as a democracy 
should be, to citizens’ judgments. If WTP seems to have distortions, surveys might seem 
better, perhaps because they invite people to consult their conscience, not simply their 
self-interest. But this approach has two fundamental problems. The first is that people’s 
answers are highly likely to depend on how the questions are set up. The second is that 
even if people do have stable answers to such questions, it is unclear that those answers 
have any moral standing for purposes of policy and law. 
1.  An analogy. Consider the analogous question of obligations to future 
generations,
120 a much-disputed problem in regulatory policy.
121 A regulatory system that 
attempts to track people’s preferences would try to measure intergenerational time 
preferences, that is, to elicit people’s judgments about how to trade off the protection of 
current lives and future lives. Hence an important question, asked in many debates about 
the issue, is whether people actually make such judgments and whether they can be 
elicited. And indeed, an influential set of studies finds that people value the lives of those 
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in the current generation far more than the lives of those in future generations.
122 From a 
series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors suggest that people are indifferent 
between saving one life today and saving 45 lives in 100 years.
123 They make this 
suggestion on the basis of questions asking people whether they would choose a program 
that saves “100 lives now” or a program that saves a substantially larger number “100 
years from now.”
124  
But it turns out that other descriptions of the same problem yield significantly 
different results.
125 Here, as in other contexts, it is unclear whether people actually have 
well-formed preferences with which the legal system can work.
126 For example, most 
people consider “equally bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single death 
from pollution in 100 years
127––implying no preference for members of the current 
generation. In another finding of no strong preference for the current generation, people 
are equally divided between two programs: one that will save 55 lives now and 105 more 
lives in twenty years; and one that will save 100 lives now and 50 lives 25 years from 
now.
128 It is even possible to frame the question in such a way as to find that future lives 
are valued more, not less, highly than current lives.
129 The most sensible conclusion is 
that people do not have robust, well-ordered intergenerational time preferences. If so, it is 
not possible for government to track those preferences, because they are an artifact of 
how the question is put. 
The issue of statistical lives (or VSL) vs. statistical life-years (or VSLY) is similar 
on this count. It should be easy to construct questions that would yield a preference for 
VSL. (Government is considering a policy that would count the value of elderly people as 
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significantly less than the value of younger people. According to one proposal, for every 
dollar that most people are worth, people over 70 are worth 53 cents. Do you approve of 
this proposal?) It should also be easy to construct questions that would suggest public 
disapproval of a uniform VSL. (Would you favor (a) a program that would save one 
hundred children from dying of a fatal cancer at the age of ten or instead (b) a program 
that would save one hundred and one senior citizens from dying of a fatal cancer at the 
age of eighty?) I have conducted a small survey myself, asking University of Chicago 
law students whether they would favor a policy that saves twenty people with a median 
age of forty or one that saves thirty people with a median age of sixty-five. By a majority 
of about two-to-one (fifty-three to twenty-five), the former policy was favored. But as in 
the context of harms to future generations, highly variable responses should be expected 
in accordance with the nature of the question. It is doubtful that people have stable, well-
considered judgments on the issue. 
2. Why the question is wrong. The more fundamental problem is that people’s 
judgments on this question should not be determinative for purposes of policy or law. 
Suppose, for example, that a relevant population concluded that it would prefer to save 
one hundred white lives to one hundred African-American lives -- or that it would prefer 
to abandon cost-benefit analysis altogether, finding both VSL and VSLY morally 
unacceptable. What kind of standing would those judgments have? Or suppose that 
existing generations concluded that a current life is worth fifty lives in 2080. Why would 
that conclusion count for purposes of policy? What matters is not the  fact of those 
judgments, but their legitimacy and their sense. If we care about WTP, it is only because 
WTP is a proxy for welfare, and because welfare deserves (some) moral standing as such. 
But eliciting people’s judgments, on future generations or VSL vs. VSLY, has no such 
justification.  
To be sure, those judgments deserve consideration and respect if they are 
reflective. And it is always possible to ask: Who will assess the legitimacy and sense of 
citizens’ judgments? This is a reasonable question, and it is certainly possible to doubt 




does not make policy on the basis of opinion polls or snapshots of people’s opinions. 
130 
The idea of relying on surveys of this kind asks the wrong question. 
 
F. A Brief Note on QALYs 
If focusing on life-years is appropriate, then it might be tempting to suggest that 
officials should be concerned with quality-adjusted life-years, or QALYs. The central 
idea behind QALYs is that regulators should be concerned with maximizing the 
aggregate health of the community.
131 To calculate QALYs, regulators come up with a 
scale that ranges from zero, for death, to one, for perfect health. Adverse health effects 
are ranked in terms of severity, with serious harms (say, a devastating but nonfatal heart 
attack) ranked lower than less serious ones (say, low-level respiratory problems). Some 
government agencies have attempted to assess regulations by calculating the QALYs that 
they save.
132 
If government should calculate VSLY, should it also calculate the value of 
QALYs, and then VQALYs, and proceed accordingly? I cannot answer that complex 
question here. But we can see that any response must come to terms with questions of 
both welfare and equity. At first glance, an effort to increase the number of QALYs has 
much to be said on its behalf. But in some contexts, the use of QALYs would raise 
serious questions of equity. Suppose, for example, that regulators are considering two 
kinds of interventions, Intervention A and Intervention B, designed to assist two different 
groups of people. The first group consists of people with extremely serious disabilities; 
Intervention A would increase their QALYs. But it would do so only by creating a 
relatively small increase in their well-being, raising them from extremely serious to 
merely serious levels of disability. The second group consists of people with  moderate 
levels of disability, and Intervention B would raise them to slight levels of disability, in a 
way that would result in significantly more QALYs than Intervention A. If QALYs are 
our guide, Intervention B is clearly preferable, and indeed it is plausible to think that 
Intervention B would result in a larger welfare gain than Intervention A. 
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Is Intervention B to be preferred? This is by no means obvious, and for two 
different reasons. First, QALYs might not be adequately measuring welfare gains in this 
context. In the abstract, it is possible that the welfare gains by Intervention A are actually 
higher even if it produces fewer increases in QALYs. Second, Intervention A is assisting 
those who are most severely disadvantaged, and people in that category have a claim on 
social attention even if helping them produces fewer QALYs than imaginable 
alternatives.
133 Those with especially severe preexisting conditions might deserve higher 
priority on equitable grounds, whatever the QALY calculus might show. Here as 
elsewhere, the pursuit of welfare, through regulation, should be undertaken in a way that 
gives distributional weights to those who are least well-off. In this way, the larger 
philosophical debates about utilitarianism and its limits find analogies in current and 
coming debates about regulatory policy. 
I do not mean to suggest that these are fundamental objections to the use of 
QALYs. The problem of severe preexisting conditions does not often arise in the context 
of regulation; it is more likely to occur in the context of medical interventions, where 
QALYs have raised special concerns. There are also hard questions about how to 
monetize QALYs, even if we decide that we should focus on them. Is the WTP approach 
appropriate here? Should VQALYs be calculated by multiplying each QALY by the 
beneficiaries’ WTP for them? Recall once again the particular problems created by forced 
exchanges: If those who obtain a large number of QALYs are not willing to pay for them, 
government does them no favors by mandating the purchase. My (tentative) analysis of 
the uses of WTP in the context of statistical lives applies, in its essential form, to the 
context of QALYs––suggesting that here as elsewhere, WTP is the best place to begin. 
 
IV. Policy Implications 
 
  I have suggested that statistical life-years are a better measure of welfare gains 
than statistical lives. I have also suggested that use of statistical life-years does not offend 
any moral prohibition on the pursuit of increasing welfare through regulation. But how, 
exactly, do these points bear on appropriate policy?  
                                                 




  We could imagine a range of possibilities. At a minimum, a focus on life-years 
allows alternatives to be ranked in terms of cost-effectiveness: A program that saves 
10,000 life-years is better than one that saves 4000, and more resources should be 
devoted to the former than to the latter. With respect to CBA, the most modest approach 
would be purely informational: to calculate both VSL and VSLY and to inform the public 
of the calculations. A mildly less modest approach would be to continue with VSL, but in 
close cases, to treat VSLY, or the age distribution of the protected population, as a kind 
of tie-breaker. When CBA produces difficult calls, agencies might be told not to act if the 
benefited class is mostly elderly, but to do so if the benefited class is mostly young. On 
this view,  the age distribution would be consulted only if the case were otherwise in 
equipoise. The most ambitious approach would be to abandon VSL and to use VSLY 
instead. On this view, VSL would be seen as a crude first step toward the more refined 
inquiry than VSLY makes possible. A number of intermediate approaches are possible. 
Perhaps VSL would be the basic foundation for analysis, but a sensitivity analysis would 
run the numbers with VSLY. Perhaps regulators would have the authority, subject to 
political constraints, to use one or another number when the circumstances make that 
decision seem reasonable.
134 
Of course there is a significant issue here: How is VSLY to be measured? I have 
suggested that WTP, for all its imperfections, is the best starting place. But at the present 
time, policymakers lack good information about changes in WTP over the lifespan. 
Government might well be inclined to use a uniform dollar figure per life-year, on the 
theory that this is the best way of combining accuracy with administrability. In fact this is 
the current practice with respect to VSLY.
135 But what dollar amount? The most natural 
possibility is to do what is done with VSL: take the median number and apply it quite 
generally. At least an approach of this kind provides a sensible place to begin.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Programmes, 8 Health Economics 25, 26-27 (1999). 
134 One implication of the present discussion involves the possibility of legal challenges to the decision to 
use either VSL or VSLY, and also to particular decisions about how to measure them. Under some statutes, 
cost-benefit analysis is the basis for decision, and in such cases, the agency’s calculations are subject to 
challenge. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991). In light of the present 
state of uncertainty, it would not be arbitrary for an agency to choose either VSL or VSLY, though there 
are plausible challenges to both measures. See Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, supra note, for relevant 
discussion. 







In this essay, I have suggested that government should focus its attention on 
statistical life-years, not statistical lives. No regulatory program makes people immortal. 
The only issue is life extension, and in terms of welfare, a program that saves 10,000 life-
years is better than one that saves 1,000 life years, holding all else constant. In welfare 
terms, a program that saves younger people is unquestionably better than one that saves 
older people, holding all else constant. No sensible person would choose to face a 
1/500,000 risk at thirty in preference to facing the same risk at sixty. Life-years, and not 
only discounting the future,
136 are a large part of the reason. But a choice in favor of life-
years leaves open questions of monetary valuation. Older people may or may not be 
willing to pay less to reduce risks than younger people. Even if older people are willing 
to pay more to save each remaining statistical life-year, it is overwhelmingly likely that 
older people are willing to pay less than younger people, in the aggregate, to save the 
number of life-years that remain.
137 I have suggested that in valuing life-years, WTP is a 
reasonable way to start, though I have also suggested some problems with WTP in terms 
of both welfare and distribution.  
To be sure, there are ethical constraints on the promotion of welfare through 
regulatory policy. Government does not legitimately assign a higher VSL to whites than 
to African-Americans. Any differences in terms of WTP and welfare are a product of 
injustice, and government should not perpetuate or increase injustice.
138 But there is no 
such injustice in the difference between the anticipated welfare g ain of a program that 
saves older people and the anticipated welfare gain of a program that saves younger 
people. In any case a focus on statistical life-years has an important kind of neutrality: It 
treats everyone’s life-years the same. I have also suggested that the claims that underlie 
the prohibition on age discrimination do not raise serious moral questions about focussing 
                                                 
136 See Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human 
Lives, 99 COL L REV 941 (1999). 
137 See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 50-53. 
138 I put to one side the complexities raised by cases in which the beneficiaries of regulation have to pay all 
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on life-years. These points suggest that in principle, it is better to attend to statistical life-
years than to statistical lives.  
  If the analysis here is correct, it has two more general implications. The first is 
that WTP is a pragmatic tool and no more. Some economists seem to identify WTP with 
welfare itself––an absurd claim that, if taken seriously, would produce both blunders and 
injustices. As we have seen, people’s WTP is sometimes poorly predictive of the welfare 
effects of one or another option
139––a point with general and underexplored implications 
for regulatory policy. The second involves constraints on the promotion of welfare. While 
welfare is indeed the basic goal of much regulation, there are constraints on the pursuit of 
that goal, and these constraints should be specified. Any attempt at specification will be 
controversial. But however the controversies are resolved, I suggest that the constraints 
do not apply to a decision to use VSLY rather than VSL. Attacks on VSLY are a product 
of confusion. Regulators should give it serious consideration. 
                                                 
139 For a great deal of relevant discussion, see Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 






Regulatory Impact Statements Using Life-Years or Quality-Adjusted Life Years 
 
FDA final seafood HACCP rule (1995).  US Food and Drug Administration: Procedures 
for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products; Final 
Rule.  60 FR 65095, December 18, 1995.  Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-
cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
FDA final anti-smoking rule (1996). US Food and Drug Administration, “Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents; Final Rule,” 61 FR 44395, August 28, 1996. Used QALYs in 
a primary benefit-cost analysis. 
 
EPA final ozone and particulate standards for outdoor air quality (1997).  ADD citation.  
Used life years but not QALYs in a sensitivity analysis of benefit-cost analysis. 
 
FDA final mammography rule (1997).  US Food and Drug Administration: “Quality 
Mammography Standards; Final Rule.” 62 FR 55851, October 28, 1997.  Used a 5-year 
survival rate approach when measuring benefits, but monetized only lives saved, using 
the value of a statistical life of $5 million. 
 
HRSA organ donor final rule (1998).  Health Resources and Services Administration: 
“Procurement and Transplantation Network; Final Rule.” 63 FR 16295, April 2, 1998. 
Used statistical life years valued at $116,000 per year, but did not use QALYs. 
 
FDA final juice labeling rule (1998).  Food and Drug Administration:  “Food Labeling: 
Warning and Notice Statement: Labeling of Juice Products; Final Rule.” 63 FR 37029, 
July 8, 1998.  Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs 
described accurately.  
 
FDA proposed consumer trans-fat labeling rule (1999).  US Food and Drug 
Administration: “Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient 
Content Claims, and Health Claims; Proposed Rule.” 64 FR 62746, November 17, 1999.  
Used monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
FDA final shell egg safety rule (2000).  US Food and Drug Administration: “Food 
Labeling, Safe Handling Statements, Labeling of Shell Eggs; Refrigeration of Shell Eggs 
Held for Retail Distribution; Final Rule.” 65 FR 76091, December 5, 2000.  Used 
monetized QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
 
EPA Tier 2 Rule (2000). 
 
FDA final juice HACCP rule (2001).  Food and Drug Administration:  “Hazard Analysis 




and Importing of Juice; Final Rule.”  66 FR 6137, January 19, 2001.  Used monetized 
QALYs in a primary benefit-cost analysis; QALYs described accurately. 
CMS immunization standards final rule with comment (2002).  Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, “Conditions of Participation: Immunization Standards for Hospitals, 
Long-Term Care Facilities, and Home Health Agencies.” 67 FR 61808, October 2, 2002.  
Used $50,000-$100,000 cost per year of healthy life saved to monetize benefits, 
assuming lifespan of 84 years. 
 